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The author examines the impact of mandatory
minimum sentencing on Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
Emphasis is placed on the recently enacted mandatory
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senteing judges to pay "particular attention to the
rumstnces of aboriginal offenders." In addition, the
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finding that mandatory minimum sentences applied to
Aboriginal offenders violate sections I2 and 15 of the
Charter.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The imposition of mandatory minimum imprisonment sentences
(particularly those recently enacted for firearms-related offences) will have
a disproportionately negative effect on Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
Documented experiences of the impact of mandatory minimum sentences
on Aboriginal peoples in Australia demonstrate this. There is every reason
to believe that mandatory minimum sentences will likewise have a
disproportionately negative impact on Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
In addition, the application of minimum imprisonment sentences
on Aboriginal peoples is contrary to the stated penal objectives of the
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Gladue t which recognized that a
different analysis and approach is required by judges when sentencing
Aboriginal offenders, one "... which may specifically make imprisonment
a less appropriate or less useful sanction. " '
Furthermore, the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences is
contrary to the stated objectives of Parliament itself in section 718.2(e) of
the Criminal Code3 which requires that "all available sanctions other than
imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be
considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of
aboriginal offenders., 4 The enactment of a mandatory minimum sentence
of imprisonment defeats the ability of the judiciary to comply with this
explicit direction of restraint in the use of imprisonment. In other words,
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions are incompatible with the
principle of restraint embodied in section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and
are particularly incompatible as they are applied to Aboriginal offenders.
Finally, mandatory minimum sentencing of Aboriginal offenders will not
survive scrutiny under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5
because of its disproportionately negative impact on Aboriginal peoples.
More precisely, there are compelling arguments to the effect that
firearms-related mandatory minimum sentences, as they are applied to
Aboriginal peoples, will more readily result in a finding of "cruel and
unusual" punishment under section 12 of the Charter. The British Columbia
I[19991 1 S.C.R. 688 [hereinafter Gladuel.
2 Ibi. at 708.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
4 Ibd., s. 718.2(e) [emphasis added].
5Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.). 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
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case R. v. Bill' has already made this determination and is illustrative of the
increased likelihood that mandatory sentences are disproportionately more
"cruel and unusual" for Aboriginal offenders as compared to non-
Aboriginal offenders.7 I would go further and argue that mandatory
sentencing, given the context of Aboriginal criminal justice, will always be
"cruel and unusual punishment" for all Aboriginal offenders. In other
words, section 12 of the Charter would render any application of a four-year
mandatory minimum sentence to an Aboriginal offender unconstitutional.?
Furthermore, the fact that a four-year mandatory minimum sentence is
distinctly cruel and unusual punishment because it is applied to Aboriginal
offenders will no doubt have a bearing on a section 15 Charter challenge
that mandatory minimum sentences as they are applied to Aboriginal
offenders are discriminatory.
II. DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCING ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES
The recent introduction of mandatory minimum sentencing for
offences involving the use of firearms is evidence of a larger "law and
order" mentality and is also influenced by a misguided use of imprisonment
as a means to better enforce gun control efforts. These politically driven
agendas will be implemented to the detriment of Aboriginal peoples.
6(1997), 13 C.R. (5th) 103 (B.C. S.C.). rev'd on other grounds [1999) B CJ. No. 493 (BC, CA,),
online: QL (BCJ) [hereinafter Bill cited to C.R.].
7Ibid at 117. InBill, Mr. Justice Taylor applied the test for determinmgthether asanctton tscruel
and unusual punishment based on R. v. Golk. [19911 3 S.CR. 4S5 [hereinafter Go!al , Mtster Juste
Gonthier held in Goltz that an assessment under section 12 of the Cliartcr requires two steps. First,
courts are to determine if the sentence as applied to the particular accused would be considered cruel
and unusual punishment because it isgrosslydisproportionate tovwhat the offender desercs Sccondly.
it must be determined whether the minimum sentence as imposed by Parliament is on its face gr-1y
disproportionate in reasonable hypothetical circumstances. Mister Justice Ta)lorconcluded that afour-
year minimum mandatory imprisonment sentence under section 236(a) of the Chranrl Coe
(manslaughter with a firearm) violated section 12 of the Charter. He then adjourned the case to allo,
the Crown an opportunity to bring section I evidence to justify the prowin In _eparate reascim;, at
[199S1 B.C.J. No. 240 (B.C. S.C.), online: QL (BJ) [hercinafterBdti 21, Mr. Jutice Ta)ler found that
the Crown failed to satisfy the Court that the provision could be sa% ed by section 1 of the Clzrtcr, His
finding that section 236(a) is unconstitutional would noiw be subject to the approach in R.,, Uart. ,
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 [hereinafter Morrisq In Momsy the majority held that section 22-(a) of the
Criminal Code (criminal negligence with a firearm) which requires a four.ear mandatory minimum
sentence was not, on its face, a %iolation of section 12 of the Charter.
For the purposes of thisarticle, thisconclusion is restricted to the four-:,ear mandatory minimum
sentences imposed when offences are committed w ,ith a firearm, This concluton may or ma not be
valid in other contexts such as murder, wvhere there is a minimum sentence of life imprisanment.
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Mandatory minimum sentencing has been implemented in Western
Australia and the Northern Territory since 1996 and 1997 respectively. If
the experiences in Australia are indicative of what is to come in Canada,
there is every reason to be very concerned.
However, unlike in Canada, the mandatory minimum sentencing
regimes in these two Australian states involve property offences. For
example, in the Northern Territory, the SentencingAct9 states that persons
found guilty of certain property offences (theft, criminal damage, unlawful
entry, etc.) shall be subject to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment
of fourteen days for a first offence, ninety days for a second offence, and
one year for a third offence. The provision does not distinguish between the
amount, value, or nature of the property. Mandatory sentencing also
applies to juveniles under the Juvenile Justice Act.t° However, in the case of
juveniles under seventeen years of age, a mandatory sentence of twenty-
eight days is not imposed until one prior conviction has been recorded."t
Although the amendments to the Juvenile Justice Act have been under
significant criticism from various quarters since their enactment, the
criticism has been magnified and gained momentum since the tragic death
of a fifteen-year-old Aboriginal boy. The boy was sentenced to twenty-eight
days imprisonment for stealing pens, pencils, and other stationary items
with a total value of less than fifty dollars. While in detention, he hung
himself with a bed sheet.12 Although this is a very tragic case, there are
countless others where Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal youths and adults
have been imprisoned for trivial property offences with similarly
devastating effects. 3
9 Sentencing Act 1995 (NT).
10 Juvenile Justice Act 1995 (NT). Unlike in Canada, each Australian state possesses original
jurisdiction over criminal law.
11For further information on the history of these provisions and the current issues surrounding
theircontinued use see Australia, Parliamentary Inquiry bySenate Legal and Constitutional References
Committee, Inquiry into the Human Rights (Mandatory Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders) Bill 1999
(Australia: 2000) at 8, online: Parliament of Australia Homepage
<http:llwww.aph.gov.au/senatelcommitteellegconctte/mandatory/> (date accessed: 21 January 2002)
[hereinafter Inquiy into Bill 1999]. Senator Brown of Australia has tabled a private members bill to
abolish mandatory minimum sentences for property offences for youth. Human Rights (Mandatory
Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders) Bill 1999, 1". Sess., 39'" Pan., Australia, 1999 (2d reading 25 August
1999) [hereinafter Senator Brown Speech].
12 B. Oquist, Mandatory Sentencing-the Jailed Generation (Sydney: Sydney Alternative Media
Centre, 2000).
13 See generally Senator Brown Speech, supra note 11.
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It is not surprising then, that Western Australia and the Northern
Territory have received harsh criticism from international human rights
treaty monitoring bodies and the legal academic community.' For example,
the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties has stated that mandatory
minimum sentencing is a violation of article 37(b) of the Convention on tle
Rights of the Child"5 which requires that deprivation of liberty not be
arbitrary and only be used as a measure of last resort. The Australian
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the Australian Law
Reform Commission have issued a joint report concluding that the
Northern Territory and Western Australia are in violation of a number of
international human rights standards and common law principles. Their
report notes that both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Canada is a signatory
to both) "... require that sentences should be reviewable by a higher or
appellate court. By definition, a mandatory sentence cannot be revieved.""
In particular, article 14(5) of The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides that a person convicted of a criminal offence must
have a right to appeal both conviction and sentence to a higher tribunal. 7
Despite these criticisms, the law has not been reformed and
continues to be a serious problem, particularly for Aboriginal offenders in
the two Australian states. The mandatory minimum sentencing provisions
have had a disproportionately negative effect on incarceration rates. For
example, the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, in
its report concerning mandatory minimum sentences and their impact on
juvenile offenders, examined incarceration data and statistics vhich
compare the impact of the Western Australia and Northern Territory
14 A number of legal articles in a special edition of the University of Net'. South %Vales La ,
Journal have been written criticizing the imposition of mandatory sentenccs in Western Austraha and
the Northern Territory. See e-g. H. Bayes,"Punishment is Blind Mandatory Sentencing of Children in
Western Australia and the Northern Territory" (1999) '1 U.N.S.W. lU,. 226; G, ZdcnWy.',. r,
"Mandatory Imprisonment of Property Offenders in the Northern Ternto r" (1999) 22 U NSW L
302; R. Hogg, "Mandatory Sentencing Legislation and the Smbolhc Polittcsof La- And Order" (1931
22 U.N.S.W. LJ. 262; N. Morgan, "Capturing Crime or Capturing Votes: The Aims and Effect of
Mandatories" (1999) 22 U.N.S.V. LI. 267; M. Adams. "Launch of UNSW La, Journal Forum on
Mandatory Sentencing Legislation" (1999) 22 U.N.S.W. LJ. Z57; and N, Cow Jert, "Mandatory Life
Sentences in New South Wales' (1999) 22 U.N.S.W. LJ. 290
15 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Report Cm the UCted Ntuwns Cencntivn an e Rl-;Ifts
of the Child, UNHCHR, 1993, UN Dec. -51141 at 346.
16 Senator Brown Speech, supra note 11 at 7738.
17 T. Quigley, "Some Issues in Sentencing of AborigInal Offenders" in R, Goae. V. Hnderson
& R. Carter, eds., ContinuingPoundazkerandRidls Quest (Sa skatoon: Punch. 1944) 267 at 29.
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mandatory minimum legislation on Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people.
The Committee referred to studies that concluded "... that in March 1997,
when the Northern Territory Government introduced mandatory
sentencing, the number of Aboriginal people in Northern Territory
corrective facilities increased from an average of 388 per month to 430 per
month within a 12 month period." 8 The report also confirmed that the
imprisonment rate of Aboriginal offenders was already staggeringly
disproportionate. "[Tihe imprisonment rate for Aboriginal people in the
Northern Territory was almost 10 times as high as that for non-Aboriginal
offenders, with a rate of about 1460 per 100 000 adults jailed, compared
with 169 per 100 000 of non-indigenous adults."' 9 The fact that Aboriginal
people are disproportionately affected by mandatory minimum sentences
for property crimes should not be surprising given their socio-economic
status in Australian society.
Aboriginal peoples disproportionately fall within the lowest social
and economic bracket of Australian society. The selection of property
offences for mandatory minimum imprisonment sentences where minority
and lower socio-economic groups are over-represented and where
Aboriginal people comprise the majority of such groups is tantamount to
imposing a system that specifically and intentionally targets Aboriginal
people for incarceration.
In Canada, although mandatory minimum sentences are aimed at
different types of offences (violence with firearms as opposed to property
offences), the impact of mandatory sentences will be the same. There are
three key reasons why the impact of mandatory minimum sentencing,
particularly for offences involving firearms, will be discriminatory against
Aboriginal peoples.
First, Aboriginal peoples are already grossly over-represented in the
criminal justice system. This is not disputed and is supported by countless
national and provincial commissions and inquiries?0 Indeed, the Supreme
18 Inquiry into Bill 1999, supra note II at 28.
19 Ibid. Senator Brown also noted that other recent research on the impact of mandatory
sentencing has confirmed a disproportionate impact. For example, a study of the Children's Court of
Western Australia between February 1997 and May 1998 showed that 80 per cent of youths sent to jail
pursuant to a mandatory minimum sentence were Aboriginal (Senator Brown Speech, supra note I1I).
20 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996)
[hereinafter RCA!p] for an excellent summary of the various reports and commissions that deal with
Aboriginal justice and their findings. The conclusion drawn from a review of all the studies and reports
was that "ItIhe Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal peoples of Canada-First
Aboriginal Peoples and Mandator, Sentencing
Court said in Gladue that judges should take judicial notice of this fact and
cited it as one of the reasons why Parliament enacted section 718.2(e) of
the Criminal Code." In Gladue, the Supreme Court was asked to interpret
the meaning of section 718.2(e) and the significance to be given to the
phrase "with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal
offenders." The Court took a very broad approach to understanding the
significance of the phrase and reviewed the circumstances of Aboriginal
peoples and their experiences with the criminaljustice system. In particular,
the Court noted that the provision was enacted to address the over-
representation of Aboriginal peoples in correctional institutions. The Court
found that the crisis of over-representation could be attributed to two
factors: (1) poor socio-economic circumstances of Aboriginal peoples have
contributed to disproportionate criminal activity, and (2) Aboriginal
peoples are subjected to the effects of systemic discrimination in the
criminal justice system. The Court unequivocally stated that over-
representation "... arises also from bias against aboriginal people and from
an unfortunate institutional approach that is more inclined to refuse bail
and to impose more and longer prison terms for aboriginal offenders."'
Thus, not only are Aboriginal people over-represented in jails, they are
more likely to be sentenced to jail than non-Aboriginal peoples. The
Manitoba Justice Inquiry found that "... 25% of Aboriginal persons
received sentences that involved some degree of incarceration, compared
to approximately 10% of non-Aboriginal persons, or 2.5 times more for
Aboriginal persons."' The Court concluded that the purpose of singling
out Aboriginal offenders for distinct sentencing treatment was to redress
this social problem "to the extent that a remedy was possible through the
sentencing process." 4 Thus, mandatory minimum sentencing, instead of
Nations, Inuit and MNtis people. on-rese ve and off-rescre, urban and rural-in all terntonal and
governmental jurisdictions" (Rc4p, ibk- at 309).
21 In Gladue, supra note 1 at 719, the Court cited reports that documented AtnrignAl
representation in federal correctional institutions in 1997 at 12 per cent e% en though their profrton
of the population is only 3 per cent. For certain proincial corrections facilities, the statitm are far
more dramatic. For example, in Saskatchewan, Aboriginal inmates made up 72 rzr cent of the
pro4ncial correctional institution population even though only 11.3 For cent of the Fpapulattan of
Saskatchewan is Aboriginal.
2 2 IbM. at 723.
23 Manitoba, Parliamentary lnquiry. The Justce Sstcn and 41',oial Pcepk %ol. I (Mantobx
Queen's Printer, 1991) at 103 [hereinafter fanitoba ItiqlurJ
2 4 Gladue, supra note I at 722.
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having a neutral effect on Aboriginal over-representation, will have a
negative effect.
A second factor that supports the conclusion that mandatory
minimum sentencing for offences involving firearms will have a
disproportionate impact on Aboriginal peoples relates to the nature of the
crimes that Aboriginal people tend to commit. Studies have indicated that
Aboriginal peoples are disproportionately over-represented in the
commission of violent offences as compared to other offences, including
property offences. In addition, most violent offences involve the abuse of
drugs or alcohol.2
Thirdly, Aboriginal peoples' use of firearms is more significant
relative to the overall Canadian population. Many Aboriginal peoples use
firearms to hunt for their livelihood or for cultural reasons. Hunting is so
important to Aboriginal peoples that courts have concluded that it is an
activity that is integral to the distinctive culture of Aboriginal peoples."6
Firearms are part of a way of life in most Aboriginal communities and are
readily accessible. For example, from my own experience, Aboriginal
people regularly travel with firearms in their vehicles. One never knows
when a moose will cross one's path.
So important is the use of firearms in some Aboriginal communities
that courts have declared the mandatory firearms prohibitions in the
Criminal Code to be unconstitutional as a violation of section 12 of the
Charter when applied to an Aboriginal offender convicted of a violent
offence. In R. v. Chief,27 the Yukon Court of Appeal considered whether a
25 Manitoba Inquiry, supra note 23 at 88.
2 6 See e.g. R v. Dick, [198512 S.C.R. 309, where the Supreme Court of Canada held that hunting
was of such importance to the members of the Alkali Lake Band that it was an integral part of who they
were, such that any interference by the province would be interfering with the core of their Indianness
and ultra vires the province, but for the application of section 88 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
2 7 [1990] 1 C.N.LR. 92 (Y.C.A.) [hereinafter Chie). See also R. v. fyerak, [1991] 2 C.N.L.R. 135
(N.W.T.C.) [hereinafter lyerak] and R. v. Jackson, [1996] Y.J. No. 134 (Terr. Ct.), online: QL (YJ)
[hereinafter Jackson]. But see R v.Johnson, [199512 C.N.LR. 158 (Y.C.A.) where the Yukon Court
of Appeal held that a mandatory firearms prohibition was not a violation of section 12 of the Charter
because the accused did not rely on hunting in any significant way. The Ontario courts have taken a
different approach. R. v. Luke (1994), 87 C.C.C. (3d) 121 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Luke], is
representative of the Ontario position. In Luke, the Court refused to declare that the mandatory
prohibition order was cruel and unusual punishment for an Aboriginal offender. The Ontario courts
have taken the view that the mandatory order is not unconstitutional on its face, nor do the Ontario
courts seem prepared to grant a "constitutional" exemption on an individual basis. This view will likely
change, however, in light of comments by Madame Justice Arbour in Morrisey to the effect that
constitutional exemptions are allowed in individual cases and indeed are the preferred approach to
dealing with section 12 Charter violations. However, it is important to note that the Ontario courts have
Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing
mandatory firearm prohibition order was "cruel and unusual punishment"
in the case of an Aboriginal trapper. The accused was charged vth assault
and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to public peace as a
result of committing an assault during a domestic dispute. Conviction under
certain provisions of the crminal Code requires the judge to impose a five-
year mandatory order prohibiting the possession of a firearm. The Court of
Appeal noted that the accused depended on hunting and trapping to make
a living. As a result, the Court held that the imposition of "a five-year
firearms prohibition against a trapper and a casual hunter alike is cruel and
unusual ..." ' I draw attention to this case simply to illustrate the
importance and prevalence of firearms in Aboriginal communities.
However, it does seem somewhat ironic that under the new firearms
mandatory sentencing provisions an Aboriginal person could be required
to spend four years in jail because of committing an offence involving a
firearm and yet successfully argue that because that person is dependent on
hunting for a living, a mandatory firearm order would be "cruel and
unusual" punishment. If Parliament, by imposing mandatory minimum
sentences for crimes involving firearms, intends to send a strong message
that offences committed with firearms should attract the most serious of
sentencing options, such a message would arguably be lost if offenders were
then allowed to posses firearms because an order denying such possession
is a violation of section 12 of the Charter. Regardless of whether these
messages are inconsistent, the point to be made here is that firearms are a
fundamental part of the lifestyle of Aboriginal peoples. This fact does not
appear to have been seriously considered by Parliament in enacting the
four-year mandatory sentencing provisions.
The implications of mandatory minimum sentences are clear. The
systemic discrimination in the justice system that contributes to the over-
incarceration of Aboriginal offenders, the disproportionate rate of violent
offences committed by Aboriginal offenders, and the high availability of
firearms within Aboriginal communities will no doubt mean that a
disproportionate number of offenders incarcerated as a result of the
mandatory minimum sentences introduced in 1996 will be Aboriginal.
yet to deal squarely with a situation w'here the Aboriginal offender ',.as dclzndcnt on huntin- for a
living. As a result, the Ontario decisions regarding this t.sue are clearl distingutishable from the facts
that gave rise to the constitutional exemptions granted in Chcf,. kvcrak, andaJcrz-u
2$ Chief. ibid. at 99.
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III. MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING IN
RELATION TO ABORIGINAL PEOPLES
It is in part because of the systemic background factors discussed
above that Parliament enacted section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. In
Gladue, the Court held that section 718.2(e) is remedial in nature and
designed to require judges to examine the causes of over-representation of
Aboriginal offenders in the corrections system and to "... endeavor to
remedy it, to the extent that a remedy is possible through the sentencing
process. ' ' 9 Furthermore, the Court recognized that the Aboriginal
perspective on sentencing with its emphasis on restorative justice, as
opposed to punishment and deterrence, is "... extremely important to the
analysis under s.718.2(e)."3 The Court explained the importance of this
approach in these words:
[lit must be recognized that the circumstances of aboriginal offenders differ from those of
the majority because many aboriginal people are victims of systemic and direct
discrimination, many suffer the legacy of dislocation, and many are substantially affected by
poor social and economic conditions. ... [Tlhe judge who is called upon to sentence an
aboriginal offender must give attention to the unique background and systemic factors which
may have played a part in bringing the particular offender before the courts. In cases where
such factors have played a significant role, it is incumbent upon the sentencing judge to
consider these factors in evaluating whether imprisonment would actually serve to deter, or
to denounce crime in a sense that would be meaningful to the community of which the
offender is a member. In many instances, more restorative sentencing principles will gain
primary relevance precisely because the prevention of crime as well as individual and social
healing cannot occur through other means. ... What is important to recognize is that, for
many if not most aboriginal offenders, the current concepts of sentencing are inappropriate
because they have frequently not responded to the needs, experiences, and perspectives of
aboriginal people or aboriginal communities. ... What is important to note is that the
different conceptions of sentencing held by many aboriginal people share a common
underlying principle: that is, the importance of community-based sanctions. ... In all
instances, it is appropriate to attempt to craft the sentencing process and the sanctions imposed
in accordance with the aboriginal perspective. 31
Mandatory minimum sentences prevent the judiciary from
complying with section 718.2(e) because mandatory minimum sentences by
their very nature preclude the consideration of sanctions that are in
accordance with the Aboriginal perspective. Moreover, the Court held that
29 Gladue, supra note I at 722.
30 Ibid. at 725.
Ibid. at 724-728 [emphasis added).
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section 718.2(e) is mandatory in the sense that judges have no discretion as
to whether or not to consider the unique circumstances of Aboriginal
offenders. By focusing on the word "should" in section 718.2(e), the Court
requires all judges to take judicial notice of the systemic and background
factors and the approach to sentencing that is most relevant to Aboriginal
offenders?2
Nowhere in section 718.2(e) is there wording that says "except in
the case of mandatory minimum sentences." What happens when two
provisions of the Criminal Code relating to sentencing are incompatible?
Parliament is silent on this. Professor Kent Roach has suggested that the
enactment of specific mandatory minimum sentences is a signal that
Parliament has placed an emphasis on the principles of punishment and
deterrence over those of rehabilitation and restoration., It is not apparent
to me that this is the appropriate construction to be given to the existence
of mandatory minimum sentences. In fact, in Bill, Mr. Justice Taylor came
to the opposite conclusion. Far from ousting the rehabilitative and
restorative sentencing principles, the very existence (as a long-standing part
of the criminal law) of such principles actually increases the likelihood that
mandatory imprisonment sentences would be found to be in violation of the
Charter. Mister Justice Taylor stated:
Although the principle of deterrence is %alid and imrortant, s.236Nal is inconsistnt %,th
fundamental principles of sentencing to the e'-tent that it, effectt, ely. completely chrmtes
other objectives of sentencing from judicial considemtion. In cascs such as the prw,nt one,
those other objectives might lead to a sentence substantially 1e5s than four year. "
Essentially, the question is one of proper statutory construction. If
the impact of Morrisey is that mandatory minimum sentencing is presumed
to represent Parliament's intention to emphasize punitive and deterrence
principles over others, then there is very little that can be achieved by
relying on section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. Fortunately, in the case
of Aboriginal offenders, if this interpretation prevails, there are other
avenues of redress that can be pursued under sections 12 and 15 of the
Charter.
32 b at 731-732.
3 K See . Roach, "Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Se ntenres" 231) 39
Osgoode Hall LJ. 367.
34 Bill, supra note 6 at 122.
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IV. ADDRESSING THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF
MANDATORY IMPRISONMENT ON ABORIGINAL
OFFENDERS
The last section of this article highlights the types of constitutional
issues and arguments that could be raised by Aboriginal peoples against
mandatory minimum sentences, particularly those related to firearm use.
While there are other Charter provisions, such as section 7, that may also
provide redress, this article surveys only section 12 and section 15
arguments.
A. Section 12 of the Charter
In Bill, Mr. Justice Taylor addressed the question of whether the
four-year minimum sentence for manslaughter using a firearm was a breach
of section 12 of the Charter.35 The accused, Lonny Bill, was at home in his
reserve community when a local gang of Aboriginal men called the
"Warriors" threw a bottle of beer at his home. He had had trouble with this
gang before. Bill had been drinking and decided to confront the gang,
which by then had moved to his neighbour's property. He took a rifle from
his house for the purpose of scaring off the gang. In the confusion that
followed, Bill discharged the gun and killed Wayne Alleck, one of the gang
members. Lonny Bill had no prior criminal record.
Mister Justice Taylor considered the impact of section 718.2(e) and,
among other factors, the fact that the offender was an Aboriginal person in
deciding upon the accused's section 12 Charter argument. In examining the
impact of a four-year minimum sentence, Mr. Justice Taylor recognized
that the Aboriginal community includes such institutions as elders and the
longhouse and that these institutions play an important role in guiding and
rehabilitating young people. 36 In particular, he observed that a four-year
minimum sentence would "strip Lonny Bill away from the very community
that could provide him with the resources that he needs and the community
in which he must begin to play a role of atonement. '37 In deciding that the
four-year mandatory minimum sentence was a breach of section 12, Mr.
Justice Taylor relied on section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which no
doubt influenced his decision that such a punishment would be cruel and
35 
Ibid.




Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatoy Sentencing
unusual under the circumstances. Thus, he found that the mandatory
sentence of four years for an offence under section 236(a) violated section
12 of the Charter. In a separate opinion, he also found that the provision
was not saved by section 1 of the Charter.
However, in R. v. KIksiak,39 Judge Browne decided not to follow
Mr. Justice Taylor's decision in the context of a case involving two
Aboriginal offenders charged under section 344 of the Criminal Code
(armed robbery). In Kuksiak, the accused assisted in the commission of an
armed robbery by providing a gun, ammunition, and a snownobile. He
pleaded guilty and assisted the police in the investigation. He argued that
a mandatory sentence of four-years imprisonment was unconstitutional
because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of
the Charter.
Judge Browne, however, distinguished Bill on the basis that section
344 is more specific in terms of the circumstances under which the provision
will apply, namely armed robbery, as opposed to manslaughter where any
number of various and distinct circumstances could give rise to the charge.
Consequently, Judge Browne was not prepared to make a finding that
section 344 was, on its face, a violation of section 12 of the Charter.3
However, Judge Browne subsequently found that the accused qualified for
a constitutional exemption and one of the reasons she gave for making such
a finding was the accused's Aboriginal heritage.4
It would appear however, that Judge Browne, unlike Mr. Justice
Taylor, did not examine the issue of Aboriginal heritage in deciding
whether section 344 of the Criminal Code was, on its face, unconstitutional.
It appears that she only considered that factor in the analysis of the
constitutional exemption. I would argue that given the Gladue decision and
the reasons discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada for singling out
Aboriginal offenders in section 718.2(e), Judge Browne ought to have
considered the significance of Aboriginal heritage in determining whether
section 344, on its face, was a violation of section 12 of the Charter because
it imposed a mandatory minimum of four-years imprisonment without
regard to relevant factors of Aboriginal heritage. Moreover, a good
:?s See Bill #2, supra note 7.
39 [199S] N.W.T.J. No. 103 (Terr. Ct.). online, QL (NWTJ) [hereinafter Ku!.sja!l
40 Ibid at para. 32.
41 Ibd. at para. 43.
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argument can be made that mandatory minima will always be in violation
of section 12 of the Charter in the case of Aboriginal offenders.
A strong argument can be made that any imposition of a mandatory
minimum sentence would be cruel and unusual punishment in the context
of Aboriginal offenders because of their right under section 718.2(e) to
have a restorative/healing perspective on sentencing to be given appropriate
consideration by the sentencing judge.
The historical circumstances of Aboriginal offenders, their
alienation and dislocation as a result of colonialism, and the current
manifestations of colonialism on their disproportionate involvement in the
prison system are the very circumstances that mandated the inclusion of
section 718.2(e) in the Criminal Code. Hence, there is an obligation
imposed upon judges to understand and appreciate the unique
circumstances and approaches to justice of Aboriginal peoples.42 The
singling out of Aboriginal offenders in section 718.2(e) recognizes the fact
that the Canadian criminal justice system is an imposed system inconsistent
with and foreign to Aboriginal traditions of resolving disputes in the
community. It also recognizes that Aboriginal involvement in crime is part
of a complex social system whereby the negative effects of colonialism,
characteristic of the historical relationship between the Aboriginal
community and the Canadian government, is just as responsible for
Aboriginal crime as are the individual decisions of each offender.
The Manitoba Inquiry made the following observations:
A century of paternalism and duplicity in government policies has had disastrous
consequences. Canada's original citizens have lost much of their land and livelihood, family
life has been ruptured, and community leadership and cohesion have broken down. These
policies have left many Aboriginal people not only impoverished, but also dependent and
demoralized. These government policies must also be held ultimately responsible for a good
portion of the high rates of Aboriginal crime, which are the almost inevitable result of social
breakdown and poverty. ... We believe it is clear that the social situation of Aboriginal
people is a direct result of a history of social, economic and cultural repression, all carried
out under a cloak of legality. This is a disturbing picture. But it also makes it clear that the
high crime rates that characterize Aboriginal communities are not a natural phenomenon,
but a direct result of government polices.4'
The inclusion of section 718.2(e) in the Criminal Code and the
special direction given to sentencing judges to consider the unique
42
See M.E. Turpel-Lafond, "Sentencing within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural
Implications of 1R v. Gladue" (1999) 4 Justice As Healing, online: University of Saskatchewan
<http://www.usask.ca/nativelaw/jah-turpel-lafond.html> (date accessed: 21 January 2002).
43 Manitoba Inquiy, supra note 23 at 110.
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circumstances of Aboriginal peoples is a response and an acknowledgment
by government that Aboriginal crime is not simply a question of individual
circumstances but rather the result of complex social factors. Fundamental
to this acknowledgment is the value given to Aboriginal concepts of justice
and dispute resolution-concepts that emphasize rehabilitation and healing
as opposed to punishment. These Aboriginal concepts are more than
"alternative" sentencing principles to Aboriginal peoples: they are primary
and fundamental. They are integral to the Aboriginal social structure and
to how Aboriginal people structure their relations with one another. These
principles would quite rightly be viewed as part of an Aboriginal right to
control their social order. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
made the following findings and conclusions in this regard:
At the heart of a new relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people must be
recognition of Aboriginal peoples inherent right of self-government.This right encompaszes
the authority to establish Aboriginal justice systems that reflect and respect Aboriginal
concepts and processes of justice.
Aboriginal nations have the right to establish criminal justice systems that reflect and respect
the cultural distinctiveness of their people pursuant to their inherent right of self.
government. This right is not absolute, hoe~er, %, hen exercised vithin the framewark of
Canada's federal system. The contemporaryexpression of Aboriginal concepts and prec.eces
of justice will be more effective than the existing non-Aboriginal system in resTonding to the
wounds that colonialism had inflicted and in meeting the challenges of maintaining peace
and security in a changing world.'
In other words, section 718.2(e) as it applies to Aboriginal offenders
may be viewed as a statutory affirmation of an Aboriginal right to have
traditional concepts of social dispute resolution applied in sentencing. A
violation of the principles in section 718.2(e) would in turn be regarded as
a violation of section 35(1) of the Constitution.!
Regardless of whether such sentencing concepts are seen as
Aboriginal rights per se, it would still be unjust to ignore their application
44 RCAP, supra note 20 at 310.
45 Constitution Ac 19S2, s.35(l), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 19S2 (U.K.), 1932, c. 11.
This section states: "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed." There is a complex body of Aboriginal law lurisprudence that would
have to be examined to determine whether the principles of rehabilitation and healing as they are
applied in the context of resolving disputes in an Aboriginal community qualify as an Aboriginal right
under section 35(I). See eg. R v. Van derPet, [1996] 2 SC.R, 507 and R. v. Spaonu;v. 1195 1 SCR.
1075. It is beyond the scope of thisarticle to fully decalvith this issue. How.ever. for an excellent in-depth
analysis, see M.R.J. Leonardy, First Nations Criminal Jurisdiction in Canada: 77Te A ,eil rl~ht to
Peacemaking under Public International and Canadian Constitutional Law (Saskatoon: Name Law
Centre, 1998).
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simply because Parliament has enacted mandatory sentencing provisions
regarding certain offences. By appreciating Parliament's progressive
thinking in singling out Aboriginal offenders and the remedial nature of
section 718.2(e), it would indeed be cruel and unusual punishment to then
deny application of this enlightened approach to sentencing when
addressing the systemic discrimination Aboriginal offenders face through
the arbitrary application of mandatory minimum imprisonment sentences.
To hold out such hope and understanding only to then turn around and
apply mandatory minimum imprisonment sentences would definitely be
cruel and unusual.
B. Section 15(1) of the Charter
Recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence such as Corbiere
v. Canada46 and Lovelace v. Ontario47 has shown that discrimination can
result from the effects of legislation that appears on its surface to be neutral.
Lovelace also determined that section 15(1) of the Charter embodies the
principle of substantive equality. This means that achieving equality may
mean treating different groups differently. 8 In Lovelace, Mr. Justice
lacobucci made the following remarks:
For, while it is often true that distinctions may produce discrimination, there are many other
situations where substantive equality requires that distinctions be made in order to take into
account the actual circumstances of individuals as they are located in varying social, political,
and economic situations."
It is well documented by the numerous Aboriginal justice inquiries
and commissions that the criminal justice system is discriminatory. The
Manitoba Inquiry concluded that:
the justice system has discriminated against Aboriginal people by providing legal sanction for
their oppression. This oppression of previous generations forced Aboriginal people into their
current state of social and economic distress. Now, a seemingly neutral justice system
discriminates against current generations of Aboriginal people by applying laws which have
an adverse impact on people of lower socio-economic status. This is no less racial
discrimination; it is merely "laundered" racial discrimination. It is untenable to say that
46 [19991 2 S.C.R. 203.
47 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 [hereinafter Lovelace].
4 
abid .49 Ibid. at 987.
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discrimination which builds upon the effects of racial dtscnmination is not racial
discrimination itself. Past injustices cannot be ignored or built up on
As mentioned before, section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code can be
viewed as a measure designed to achieve substantive equality in the
sentencing of Aboriginal offenders. In Gladue, the Court made the
connection between equality and section 718.2(e) explicit when it stated:
The fact that a court is called upon to take into consideration the unique circumstancs
surrounding these different parties is not unfair to non-abariginal p eople. Rather, the
fundamental purpose of s.718.2(e) is to treat aboriginal offenders fairly by taking into
account their difference'
Thus, the imposition of mandatory sentencing, viewed from the
perspective of section 718.2(e), prevents the realization of equality for
Aboriginal peoples in the sentencing process. Mandatory sentencing
provisions essentially deny courts the ability to rectify statutorily
acknowledged racial discrimination. Since section 718.2(e) is designed, in
part, to address racial discrimination against Aboriginal peoples in
sentencing, it follows that any statutory provision that denies Aboriginal
offenders the benefit of such a targeted and remedial provision is itself
discriminatory.
Again, the experience of Australia is helpful. Although Australia
does not have a Charter, critics of the mandatory minimum sentencing
regime have drawn support from international instruments including the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forns of Racial
Discrimination (to which Canada is a signatory).- Martin Flynn, aprofessor
in the Faculty of Law at the University of Western Australia, has argued
that mandatory sentencing laws violate the principle of equality under
articles 1(1), 2, and 5 of CERD. Professor Flynn explains:
The Commonwealth. Western Australian and Northern Territory Gwcrnments arzcrt that
mandatory sentencing laws do not discriminate on the grounds of race, They argue that the
same sentencing laws apply to all. This argument fails to appreciate the existence of a
prohibition against indirect discrimination. The Preamble and articles 1(1), 2 and 5 of CEflP
prohibit acts which have a discriminatory purpas2 or effect. The effca of mandatoiy
sentencing laws is that the court must ignore racial factors that are rclc%;ant to sentencng.
The eftct is to iolate the right to equal treatment before the tribunals admtnistennglustice
5 0 Manitoba Inquhy, supra note 23 at 109.
51 Gladue, supra note I at 733.
5 2 Internaional Convention on dte Elimination ofAl Fcms of Raewt Dtsctianmatwn, 7 March 196 .
660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
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(article 5(a) CERD). Equal treatment before courts administcringjustice in Western Australia
and the Northern Territory requires consideration of the different impact of sentencing
options on different racial groups. The persistence of mandatory sentencing legislation in
Western Australia and Northern Territory ensures the disproportionate imprisonment of
Aboriginal people in those jurisdictions.'
Since article 5(a) of CERD contains the same concept of substantive
equality that is built into section 15 of the Charter, one could argue by
analogy that mandatory minimum imprisonment is likewise a violation of
equality under section 15.
Although the three-stage section 15 test pronounced in Law v.
Canada' and reaffirmed in Lovelace requires a specific contexualized
analysis to be applied, it is not undertaken in any detail here. In fact, the
existence of discrimination is so obvious that it would be an embarrassing
waste of energy to apply the three-stage test to the circumstances of
mandatory minimum sentencing of Aboriginal people for firearms-related
offences. It is painfully clear that Aboriginal peoples will be discriminated
against because mandatory minimum sentences do not allow courts to take
into account relevant differences in order to address the underlying
systemic and substantive inequality Aboriginal offenders face in the
sentencing process. To impose a mandatory minimum sentence of four
years for an offence involving a firearm, in light of the purpose of section
718.2(e)-namely to address the injustice in the existing criminal justice
system-is the equivalent of legislatively re-creating inequitable treatment
against Aboriginal peoples when the federal government has already
acknowledged its existence and provided for its redress. The only
conclusion one can draw from this state of affairs is that Parliament is
saying that despite its acknowledgment of discrimination, it is going to
ignore this discrimination and in fact reinforce it in certain circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
How is it possible that the government of Canada can be so well
intentioned in addressing systemic discrimination inherent in the sentencing
of Aboriginals by singling them out for special treatment while at the same
time imposing mandatory sentences that do not make any distinction
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal offenders? A neutral
M. Flynn, "Mandatory Sentencing, International Law and the Howard/Burke Deal" (2000) 4
Indigenous L Bull. 7 at 9 [emphasis in original].
5 4 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), ( 19991 1 S.C.R. 497.
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interpretation would suggest that Parliament was simply not aware of the
implications of, and the inconsistencies in, its penal policies. A more
pessimistic interpretation is that Parliament was aware of these implications
and inconsistencies, but simply did not care.
Mandatory sentences such as those imposed for firearms-related
offences will clearly have a disproportionately negative impact on
Aboriginal peoples. This impact has already been documented in Australia
in the context of mandatory sentencing for property offences. It is only a
matter of time before the statistics will indicate the same results in Canada.
In light of such blatant ignorance on the part of the government of
Canada, or perhaps because of it, the application of mandatory minimum
sentencing to Aboriginal peoples for firearms-related offences will
invariably qualify as a form of "cruel and unusual" punishment under
section 12 of the Chaner. However, even if a judge is not prepared to
declare mandatory minimum sentencing provisions unconstitutional on
their face, then, as has already been the case in at least one reported
decision, section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code will weigh heavily in favour
of granting constitutional exemptions to individual Aboriginal offenders.
Finally, mandatory minimum sentences are clearly a violation of
section 15 of the Charter because they discriminate against Aboriginal
offenders. Aboriginal offenders sentenced under mandatory minimum
provisions will not be able to benefit from section 718.2(e) of the Criminal
Code, which is intended to ameliorate discrimination against Aboriginal
peoples in sentencing. If a general provision is designed to address
substantive discrimination against Aboriginal offenders and a class of those
same offenders is precluded from its benefit, it follows that the very act of
exclusion is itself discriminatory.
2001)

